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Securities Law: Implied Causes of Action Under
Section 14 (e) of the Williams Act
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 14(e) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act) prohibits a variety of fraudulent practices "in con-
nection with any tender offer."1 In passing this legislation,
Congress did not explicitly give target company shareholders
the right to sue under section 14(e). The federal courts and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have consistently
struggled to determine whether Congress intended to provide a
private cause of action for target shareholders under section
14(e) and, if it did so intend, the circumstances under which
that cause of action arises.
Although most lower federal courts and commentators
agree that a private cause of action is implied under section
14(e), 2 they disagree as to the action's scope. Two distinct ap-
proaches to this latter problem have developed. Most federal
courts have thus far allowed target shareholders to sue under
section 14(e) only to prevent or offset damages that they may
incur in deciding whether to tender their shares. 3 The SEC4
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). Congress originally enacted section 14(e) as
part of the Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (1976)).
A conventional tender offer "normally consists of a bid by an individual or
group to buy shares of a company-usually at a price above the current market
price." S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) [hereinafter cited as S.
REP.]; HR. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP.], reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2811. Courts have
also recognized that unconventional means of carrying out a tender offer exist.
See generally E. ARANOW, IL EINHoRN & G. BERSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN
TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1-34 (1977); Note, The Developing
Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARv.
L REV. 1250 (1973).
2. See infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 59-68.
4. Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae at 9-22, Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,
646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981); SEC Amicus Brief, Le-
vine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971), reprinted in 85 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) E-1, E-2 to E-4 (1971).
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and some courts5 would recognize not only these actions, but
would also give shareholders the right to sue to prevent or off-
set damages that they may incur in deciding whether to sell
their shares on the market before the tender offer takes effect.
This Note begins by reviewing why Congress enacted sec-
tion 14(e). It then analyzes the Supreme Court's general reluc-
tance to recognize implied causes of action, and suggests that
the Court's reservations do not apply to shareholder actions
under 14(e) based upon shareholder decisions whether to
tender their shares. The Note continues by suggesting that
there are also sound reasons to imply a cause of action for
shareholder actions based on shareholder decisions whether to
sell their shares before the tender offer takes effect. Finally,
assuming the validity of these implied causes of action, the
Note advocates a rule of law defining when to begin holding
the target company responsible for pre-tender offer
misrepresentations.
II. HISTORICAL AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF
FEDERAL TENDER OFFER CONTROLS
In the 1960's and 1970's, the use of the cash tender offer to
acquire control over a target company became widespread. 6
The tender offer grew in popularity because, unlike mergers,
proxy contests, or exchange offers, tender offers were not regu-
lated.7 Takeover bidders could, therefore, use surprise tactics
to their advantage in forcing quick decisions by shareholders
5. E.g., Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1325 (W.D. Mich.
1978). For an analysis of this view, see infra text accompanying notes 126-72.
6. The aggregate of all the cash tender offers made in 1960 was less than
$200,000,000. By 1965, that total was almost $1,000,000,000, thus exceeding stock
exchange offers, which amounted to $500,000,000 in both 1960 and 1965. Full Dis-
closure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hear-
ings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1967) (statement of Manuel F.
Cohen, Chairman, SEC) [hereinafter cited as Sen. Hearings]. The number of
tender offers increased drastically in the 1960's and 1970's. S. REP., supra note
1, at 2; H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 2812; E. AANwow, H. EnnsoRN & G. BERISTEIN, supra note 1, at vi;
Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids-For Bidders, Incumbent Man-
agements & Shareholders, HARv. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1967, at 135, 136-37. For a
breakdown of tender offers for the years 1956-79, see Austin, Tender Offer Up-
date: 1978-79, MERGERS & AcQU-srroNs, Summer 1980, at 13, 15.
7. Federal law requires companies making proxy challenges or stock ex-
change offers to make full disclosure of their intentions before acting to acquire
another corporation. For the law governing proxy challenges, see Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-
1 to .14a-103 (1981). The Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5-8, 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-h, j
(1976), governs stock exchange offers. This Act covers these offers because it
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and in thwarting defensive responses by target management.8
The cash offer was also easier and less expensive 9 to imple-
ment than a proxy contest.
In these early cash tender battles, offerors often subjected
shareholders to risks beyond the shareholders' control. In de-
ciding how to respond to a tender offer, shareholders not only
faced time pressures, but also could not obtain information
about the managerial policies the offeror would implement
upon acquiring the target company.1O Securities investors thus
never knew whether their best interests lay in retaining their
securities, tendering them to the offeror, or selling them in the
open market."
Attempts to regulate cash tender offers under existing leg-
islation were unsuccessful. Injured parties could not obtain re-
lief under rule 1Ob-5,12 which prohibits fraudulent practices and
statements "in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity," because it did not place bidders under a duty to dis-
close their intentions.' 3 In response to the deteriorating
situation, Congress amended the 1934 Act in 1968.14 The legisla-
tion, introduced by Senator Williams, was "designed to require
treats an exchange of stock as an issuance of securities. See United States v.
Riedel, 126 F.2d 81, 83 (7th Cir. 1942).
8. Before 1968, when Congress passed the Williams Act, offerors could
force shareholders to act within very limited time periods. Easterbrook & Fis-
chel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Of-
fer, 94 HARv. T. REv. 1161, 1162 n.6 (1981). Offerors could also specify that
shareholders' tenders were irrevocable. Id.
9. Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U.
PA. L. REv. 317, 320-21 (1967). One study indicated that the costs of a proxy con-
test are three times that of a cash tender offer. Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1966, at 1,
col 6. The study treated the money that the bidder spends in buying target
company stock as an investment, rather than as an expense of the offer. Id.
10. The discussion in Congress that preceded the passage of section 14(e)
pointed out the shareholder's lack of information. "At present, the law does not
even require that [a takeover bidder] disclose his identity, the source of his
funds, who his associates are, or what he intends to do if he gains control of the
corporation." S. REP., supra note 1, at 2; H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 2-3, re-
printed in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2812.
11. See id.
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). The SEC enacted the regulation under the
authority of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
13. Rule lOb-5 mandates disclosure of one's intentions only in insider trad-
ing situations. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230, 235 (1980). A
fiduciary relationship, giving rise to the duty to disclose under rule lOb-5, can
develop if the offeror, prior to making a tender offer, has made a series of mar-
ket purchases and has obtained publicly undisclosed material data about the
target company from target management. Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 9,
at 332. Offerors obtain this inside information relatively infrequently, however.
Id. at 331.
14. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. I No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454.
1982]
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full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the
same time providing the offeror and management equal oppor-
tunity to fairly present their case."1 5
The five elements of an action under section 14(e) of the
Williams Act 16 parallel the five elements of the common law
tort of deceit.17 The plaintiff must prove that target manage-
ment made, in connection with a tender offer: (1) a misstate-
ment or omission;18 (2) of a material fact;19 (3) with intent to
15. S. REP., supra note 1, at 3.
16. Section 14(e) provides in full:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of
security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request,
or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsec-
tion, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, decep-
tive, or manipulative.
Twenty-seven states have enacted statutes that parallel section 14(e) and
outlaw fraudulent conduct either in connection with a takeover bid or in con-
nection with a tender offer. ALASKA STAT. § 45.57.040 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 67-1264.4 (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-123 (Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 36-462 (West 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1905 (1977); Illinois Business
Take-Over Act, § 8, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.58 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981);
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3.1-8.5 (Burns Supp. 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1503
(West Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 808 (1981); MD. CORPS. & ASs'NS
CODE ANN. § 11-904 (Supp. 1981); MASS ANN. LAws ch. 110C, § 7 (Michie/Law.
Coop. Supp. 1981); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 451.910 (Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT.
§ 80B.05 (1980); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-72-109 (Supp. 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 409.525 (Vernon 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2412 (1977); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 78.3777 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-A:8 (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 49:5-8 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1611 (McKinney Supp. 1981);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78B-5 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 442 (West 1981); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 47-32-11. (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2106 (1979);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-4-7 (1978); VA. CODE § 13-1-533 (1978); Wis. STAT. § 552.09
(1977). See also FED. SEC. CODE § 1602(a) (3) (Proposed Official Draft 1978)
(statute patterned on section 14(e)).
17. A plaintiff must prove the following elements to state a cause of action
for deceit: a false representation made by the defendant; knowledge or belief
on the part of the defendant that the representation is false, or the defendant's
lack of a sufficient basis of information to make the representation (the scien-
ter requirement); the defendant's intention to induce the plaintiff to act or re-
frain from acting in reliance on the misrepresentation; justifiable reliance by
the plaintiff in acting or refraining from action; and damage to the plaintiff due
to such reliance. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 685-86
(4th ed. 1971).
18. Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 362 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
19. In proving materiality, a plaintiff must demonstrate that reasonable
persons would consider a particular fact important in making an investment
decision. Id. at 363.
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defraud third party investors;20 (4) who subsequently relied on
the misrepresentations or omissions;2 1 and (5) suffered damage
as a result of that reliance.22
III. IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 14(e)
ON BEHALF OF TARGET SHAREHOLDERS
Only the SEC has explicit authority to act under section
14(e). 23 In recognizing section 14(e) suits by target company
20. Courts have used two different standards in determining the culpabil-
ity of defendants under section 14(e). Some courts advocate a negligence stan-
dard. See, e.g., SEC v. Wills, 472 F. Supp. 1250, 1268 (D.D.C. 1978). Other courts
support a standard of reckless failure to make available material facts that the
defendant could have discovered with reasonable effort. See, e.g., Chris-Craft
Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
910 (1973).
The Supreme Court recently held in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), that
plaintiffs need not prove scienter under either section 17(a) (2) or section
17(a) (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 but must do so under section 17(a) (1). Id.
at 697. Section 17(a) (1) makes it unlawful "to employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud." The Court noted that this language indicates that intent is
an element. Id. It reasoned, however, that section 17(a)(2), which prohibits
the procurement of money or property "by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact," does not imply that a
plaintiff must prove intent to defraud. Id.
Section 14(e) has two operative portions. The first provision makes it un-
lawful "to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state any
material fact." This language is similar to section 17(a) (2), and thus plaintiffs
alleging a violation under this portion of the statute should arguably not have
to prove scienter. But see Adams v. Standing Knitting Mills, 623 F.2d 422, 431
(6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Adams v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 449
U.S. 1067 (1980) (ignoring the first clause of section 14(e)); SEC v. Texas Int'l
Co., 498 F. Supp. 1231, 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (same).
The second provision of section 14(e) makes it unlawful "to engage in any
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices." This language, like
section 17(a) (1), implies that a plaintiff must prove intent to deceive. Plaintiffs
alleging a section 14(e) violation on these grounds should, therefore, arguably
have to prove scienter. See Note, Tender Offer Developments in 1980, 38 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 999, 1005 (1981).
21. Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 373 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
22. Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act provides that "no person permitted to
maintain a suit for damages... shall recover.., a total amount in excess of
his actual damages." 15 U.S.C. § 78b(a) (1976). In Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107
(2d Cir. 1981), the court concluded that "actual damages" refers to compensa-
tory damages under a "benefit-of-the-bargain" standard rather than an "out-of-
pocket" loss standard if the court can readily calculate such damages. Id. at
114. See also Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 283 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981).
23. As originally enacted, section 14(e) did not explicitly grant the SEC
rulemaking powers. Congress amended the statute in 1970 to give the SEC ex-
press authority to promulgate regulations proscribing fraudulent conduct. Act
of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 5, 84 Stat. 1497, 1498. Although the SEC has
enacted a variety of regulations, it has used its enforcement powers to institute
lawsuits under section 14(e) on only eight occasions. SEC v. Mize, 615 F.2d
19821
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shareholders, the courts must, therefore, imply a cause of ac-
tion. The initial barrier facing a court that wishes to do so is
the Supreme Court's current unsympathetic attitude toward
implied causes of action.
A. THE SUPREME CouRT's RELUCTANCE TO IMPLY PRIvATE
CAUSES OF ACTION
The Supreme Court was once very willing to imply private
causes of action under federal statutes. 24 Cort v. Ash,25 how-
ever, marked a shift in the Supreme Court's approach to im-
plied causes of action. The Court set out a more stringent,
four-factor test for implying causes of action. The Court asked
whether the plaintiff belonged to "the class for whose especial
benefit" Congress enacted the statute, whether there was any
evidence that the legislature intended to create a private rem-
edy, whether a private remedy was consistent with the legisla-
tive scheme of the statute, and whether the cause of action was
one traditionally relegated to state law.2 6 When lower courts
began to use these factors freely to justify implying causes of
1046 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 901 (1980); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera
Italiana, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L, REP. (CCH) 98,346 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 16, 1981); SEC v. Texas Int'l Co., 498 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Wellman
v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); SEC v. Wills, 472 F. Supp. 1250
(D.D.C. 1978); SEC v. General Host Corp., 438 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); SEC
v. American Beef Packers, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,079 (D. Neb. May 4, 1977); SEC v. Milgo Elec. Corp., No. 77-0189 (D.D.C.
Feb. 3, 1977) (available Feb. 28, 1982 on LEXIS, Fedsee library, Courts fie). In
comparison, the federal reporters reveal that private parties have sought relief
under section 14(e) on over 300 occasions. The SEC has, however, recently au-
thorized its General Counsel to determine whether to submit briefs, amicus cu-
riae, urging equitable relief in cases arising under the Williams Act. SEC
Litigation Release No. 9625, Mar. 23, 1982, reprinted in [1982 Current Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,200, at 84,950.
24. See, e.g., J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (Court implied a pri-
vate damage action under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)
(1976)). The majority relied upon the statutory language indicating that Con-
gress enacted section 14(a) "for the protection of investors." Id. at 432 (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976)). According to the Court, this purpose "impl[ied] the
availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result." Id.
Section 14(a) makes it
unlawful for any person ... to solicit or to permit the use of his name
to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any secur-
ity.., in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commis-
sion may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
25. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
26. Id. at 78. The majority applied this four-tiered analysis and denied the
plaintiff a private right of action under a federal criminal statute prohibiting
corporate contributions to presidential election campaigns. Id. at 80-85.
[Vol. 66:865
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action,27 the Supreme Court retreated even further. 28 In Can-
non v. University of Chicago,29 although a majority of the Court
inferred a private cause of action under the Education Amend-
ments Act of 1972,30 Justice Rehnquist, in his concurring opin-
ion, adopted a fairly narrow interpretation of Cort, emphasizing
its second factor, which focuses on legislative intent.31 In his
dissent, Justice Powell openly attacked the Cort analysis, and
urged that the Court imply private relief only on the basis of
"the most compelling evidence" that Congress intended such
relief.3 2
The Court appeared to follow these critical views in Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington,33 in which the majority refused to in-
27. Justice Powell noted in 1979 that since Cort v. Ash, at least twenty ap-
pellate decisions had applied the Cort standard to imply federal private causes
of action. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 741-42 (1979) (Powell,
J., dissenting). See, e.g., Montgomery Improvement Ass'n v. HUD, 645 F.2d 291,
295 (5th Cir. 1981) (court implied injunctive relief for city residents under title
VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Housing & Community Development Act
of 1974); Wachovia Bank & Trust v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342,
351-53 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. White & Case v. Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co., 452 U.S. 954 (1981) (court implied damage relief to buyers of newly
issued securities under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act; Chumney v. Nixon, 615
F.2d 389, 394 (6th Cir. 1980) (court implied damage action under criminal stat-
ute of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 providing penalties for personal assaults
on aircraft within United States special aircraft jurisdiction).
28. J1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), represents the Supreme
Court's most liberal approach. After Cort, the Supreme Court heard, and re-
jected, a variety of different pleas for implying private remedies in federal stat-
utes lacking an explicit private remedy. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S.
287 (1981) (refused to imply private injunctive relief under section 10 of the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899); Universities Research Ass'n v.
Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981) (rejected an employee's claim for back wages as an
implied right of action under the Davis-Bacon Act); Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (rejected an implied damage claim under
section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976));
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (denied private damage ac-
tion under section 17(a) of the 1934 Act); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1
(1977) (denied defeated tender offeror implied damage relief against target
company under section 14(e) of the Williams Act).
29. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
30. Id. at 689-708 (construing 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976)). The plaintiff
claimed, under section 901(a) of title IX of that act, that a medical school was
guilty of sex discrimination in denying her application for admission. 441 U.S.
at 680.
31. Justice Rehnquist stated that "[t]he question of the existence of a pri-
vate right... is basically one of statutory construction ... [which depends
upon] an intent to create a private right of action." 441 U.S. at 717-18 (Rehn-
quist, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 749 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell thought that Borak
was an anomoly. Id. at 735-36.




fer a private remedy under section 17(a) of the 1934 Act.34 Like
Justices Powell and Rehnquist in Cannon, the Court stressed
the importance of congressional intent,35 and concluded that
Congress did not intend to create a private cause of action
under section 17(a), reasoning that the section has no remedies
for its violation and is thus not proscriptive in character.36 The
Court also argued that if Congress had intended to provide a
private remedy in section 17(a), it could have done so, just as it
did in sections 9(a), 16(b), and 18(a) of the same Act.3 7 Finally,
it pointed out that section 18(a), which provided a private rem-
edy for the alleged wrong, did not extend that remedy to the
plaintiff, and refused to expand Congress's express language.3 8
The Supreme Court confirmed its antipathy toward implied
causes of action in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis,39
refusing to imply damage relief under section 206 of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940,40 a broad antifraud provision. The
Court concluded that Congress intended to exclude private liti-
gation for damages under the statute. 41 Although the section
was proscriptive and intended to benefit the plaintiff,42 the
Court argued that Congress was aware that it could have
granted private relief under section 206, since it provided for
such relief in other independent sections of the Act,43 and re-
fused to expand the relief that Congress had chosen to give.44
The Court has continued to emphasize congressional intent
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976). Section 17(a) is a reporting requirement for
national securities exchanges, members of national securities exchanges, and
brokers and dealers who transact securities business through such members.
35. 442 U.S. at 575. The majority argued that even the Cort majority had
stressed the importance of legislative intent. "Indeed, the first three factors
discussed in Cort... are ones traditionally relied upon in determining legisla-
tive intent." Id. at 575-76.
36. Id. at 568-71.
37. Id. at 571-72.
38. Id. at 572-74. Section 18(a) provides a private remedy for misstate-
ments contained in the reports required under section 17(a) that is available
only to purchasers and sellers of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). The
Court refused to extend this remedy to the plaintiff, who was neither a pur-
chaser nor a seller. Id. at 574.
39. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
41. 444 U.S. at 24.
42. Id. at 16.
43. Id. at 20-21.
44. Id. at 20. Under the statute at issue in Transamerica, however, unlike
that at issue in Redington, there were no private remedies, only administrative
and criminal sanctions. Id. The majority also argued that Congress's omission
of the phrase "actions at law" from the Act's jurisdictional component meant
that Congress intended no damage relief under the Act. Id. at 22.
[Vol. 66:865
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and to refuse to infer private causes of action.45
Despite the Supreme Court's skepticism of implied rights
of action,46 it has not totally foreclosed the implication of pri-
vate remedies. The Court, for example, held that private in-
junctive relief was an available remedy in Transamerica,47 even
though it refused to grant private damage relief in the same
case.48 According to the Court in both Transamerica4 9 and Red-
ington,5 0 it is willing to infer private relief if the plaintiff dem-
onstrates that Congress intended to grant this remedy. The
Court has indicated that plaintiffs can demonstrate this intent
45. See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981); Universities
Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981). If the plaintiff does not
demonstrate congressional intent, the other Cort factors are irrelevant. In
Transamerica, for example, the plaintiff argued that, despite congressional in-
tent, the Court should imply private relief, because such relief was consistent
with the statute and was not traditionally relegated to state law. 444 U.S. at 23.
The majority rejected the plaintiff's arguments, stating that these two Cort fac-
tors "standing alone" would not justify the implication of a private remedy. Id.
at 23-24. The Supreme Court, however, has not overruled Cort. Justice Powell,
the most severe critic of Cort, recently implied that Cort v. Ash was still viable.
See Arguments Before the Court-Securities and Exchanges: Commodities; im-
plied rights of action, 50 U.S.L.W. 3411, 3412 (1981).
46. Many commentators interpret Redington and Transamerica as signal-
ing the Supreme Court's stricter approach to implication of private relief. See,
e.g., Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 562 (1981); Under-
wood, Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis: An Analysis of the
Supreme Court's Definition of an Implied Right ofAction, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
533, 548 (1980); Note, Implied Causes of Action: A Product of Statutory Con-
struction or the Federal Common Law Powers?, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 355, 355
(1980); Note, The Federal Securities Acts: The Demise of the Implied Private
Rights Doctrine?, 1980 U. ILL L.F. 627, 630; Note, Private Causes of Action from
Federal Statutes: A Strict Standard for Implication by Sole Reliance on Legis-
lative Intent, 14 U. RicH. L. REV. 605, 618-19 (1979).
The Court has limited private remedies in securities cases ten times since
1975. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Piper
v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
438 (1976); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49
(1975); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). One com-
mentator, noting the Court's extensive activity in this area, stated that "[t]here
can be little doubt about the intensity of the Court's concern over the expan-
sion of securities liability, and its determination to curb [this trend]." 4 A.
BROMBERG, SEcuRrriEs LAw, FRAUD, SEC RuLE 10n-5 at § 384.2 (1977). As this
issue of the Minnesota Law Review went to press, however, the Supreme Court
issued a new and more liberal standard for the implication of private relief in
federal statutes. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 50 U.S.L.W.
4457, 4464 (1982). See infra note 85.
47. 444 U.S. at 19.
48. See supra text accompanying note 40.
49. See 444 U.S. at 18-19.
50. See 442 U.S. at 575-76.
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by meeting the four Cort factors.5 '
The Court specifically addressed the availability of implied
causes of action under section 14(e) in Piper v. Chris-Craft In-
dustries,52 and refused to imply a cause of action for the plain-
tiff,53 a defeated tender offeror. Although this decision appears
to confirm the Court's general skepticism of implied private re-
lief, the Court focused on the role of the plaintiff as a tender of-
feror.5 4 The Court used the four Cort factors to buttress its
conclusion that Congress intended the Williams Act neither to
protect such offerors,5 5 nor to give this class a cause of action
for damages. 56 In contrast, the Court asserted that target com-
pany shareholders are "the direct and intended beneficiaries of
the legislation."57 Although the Court explicitly declined to
rule whether target shareholders could raise claims under sec-
tion 14(e),58 its analysis clearly does not preclude, and may
support, such a cause of action. Thus, if one demonstrates that
section 14(e) satisfies the four Cort criteria, the Supreme Court
might imply a cause of action for target shareholders.
B. IMPLYING SECTION 14(E) PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION TO
PROTECT SHAREHOLDERS' TENDER OFFER DECISIONS
Lower federal courts have traditionally implied private re-
lief for target shareholders who base their claims on the dam-
ages that they may incur or have incurred in deciding to tender
their shares.5 9 Target shareholders can base three distinct pri-
vate causes of action on this rationale. First, they can claim re-
lief for target management's post-tender offer misconduct that
has affected their tender decision.60 Second, they can claim
damage relief for target management's pre-tender offer miscon-
51. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 688. For a similar indica-
tion by the Court in Redington, see supra note 35. The Court noted, however,
that this would present an "atypical situation." See 441 U.S. at 717.
52. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
53. Id. at 42.
54. Id. at 31-33.
55. Id. at 29-35.
56. Id. at 37-41.
57. Id. at 32. The Court strongly emphasized that Congress passed the Act
to protect target shareholders. Id. at 28-41. It noted that the Act "Was designed
solely to get needed information to the investor, the constant focal point of the
committee hearings." Id. at 31.
58. "Whether shareholder-offerees, the class protected by § 14(e), have an
implied cause of action under § 14(e) is not before us, and we intimate no view
on the matter." Id. at 42 n.28.
59. See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 63-92.
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duct that has affected this same decision.61 Finally, they can
claim injunctive relief before the tender offer takes effect based
upon target management's pre-tender offer misconduct that
may affect their future tender decisions.62
1. Post-Tender Offer Misconduct
Most federal courts have recognized the right of target
shareholders to bring an action under section 14(e) against tar-
get management for the misrepresentations that management
makes after a tender offer takes effect.63 These courts have im-
plied a cause of action for target shareholders who have relied
to their detriment6 4 on target management's misstatements by
either tendering6 5 or failing to tender6 6 their shares to the bid-
der. Under these decisions, shareholders may sue for either in-
junctive relief67 or for damages. 68 Post-tender offer misconduct
that affects a shareholder's tender decision is the most compel-
ling example of conduct for which target shareholders should
be able to sue under section 14(e); such a cause of action
squarely satisfies all four Cort criteria.
Target shareholders clearly belong to the class for whose
"especial benefit" Congress passed the Williams Act. In Piper
v. Chris-Craft Industries, the Supreme Court indicated that
61. See infra text accompanying notes 93-112.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 113-23.
63. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 64, 66-68. In a shareholder's suit under
section 14(e), based on the offeror's omission of information from the tender of-
fer itself, the Seventh Circuit noted that "[ajlthough the Williams Act contains
no explicit provision for a private cause of action, it is generally accepted that
there is an implied right of action under § 14(e)." Indiana Nat'l Bank v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 578 F.2d 180, 183 n.5 (7th Cir. 1978). The Fifth Circuit followed "the
overwhelming weight of authority" in implying a cause of action under section
14(e) for a target shareholder suing for misrepresentation made after the
tender offer took effect. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596 n.20
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974). One court has implied a cause of
action under section 14(e) even though the tender offeror withdrew the offer af-
ter it had taken effect. Fabrikant v. Jacobellis, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L REP. (CCH) 92,686, at 99,018 (E.D.N.Y. June 3, 1970).
64. In Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins., 465 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Tex.
1979), nontendering shareholders who sued target management for damages
did not succeed in stating a claim, since the shareholders admitted that target
management had not fooled them into retaining their securities. Id. at 1369.
65. Id. at 1367 (dicta).
66. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins., 465 F. Supp. 1349,
1367 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Peterson v. Federated Dev. Co., 387 F. Supp. 355, 359
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
67. Smith v. Newport Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 874, 877 (D.R.I 1971).
68. Newman v. Electronic Speciality Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) T 92,591, at 98,703 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 31, 1969).
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Congress enacted section 14(e) solely for the benefit of target
shareholders.69 The legislative history of the Williams Act sup-
ports this conclusion.7 0 Given this legislative history and its
clear interpretation by the Supreme Court, this cause of action
satisfies the first Cort factor.
Under the second Cort factor, a court must decide whether
any evidence of legislative intent suggests that it should recog-
nize private relief. Congress plainly enacted section 14(e) to
protect target shareholders from making uninformed tender de-
cisions. Although section 14(e) itself makes no reference to the
protection of investors or of target shareholders, its legislative
history indicates that Congress wanted to ensure that investors
made fully informed investment decisions.7 1
69. 430 U.S. at 28-32. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. One com-
mentator suggests that target shareholders not only belong to the section 14(e)
protected class, but that they constitute the entire class. Pitt, Standing to Sue
Under the Williams Act After Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship on Troubled Waters,
34 Bus. LAW. 117, 188 (1978).
70. During the Senate hearings on the bill, Manuel F. Cohen, SEC chair-
man, testified that "the general approach of... this bill is to provide the inves-
tor, the person who is required to make a decision, an opportunity to examine
and to assess the relevant facts." Sen. Hearings, supra note 6, at 15. When in-
troducing his bill, S. 510, before the Senate, Senator Williams noted that "[t] his
legislation will close a significant gap in investor protection under the Federal
securities laws by requiring the disclosure of pertinent information to stock-
holders when persons seek to obtain control of a corporation by a cash tender
offer or through open market or privately negotiated purchases of securities."
113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
The Senate and House reports noted that "[t]he public shareholder must
... with severely limited information, decide what course of action he should
take [with respect to a tender offer] .... This is precisely the kind of dilemma
which our Federal securities laws are designed to prevent." S. REP., supra note
1, at 2; H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 2-3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 2812. The Chris-Craft court relied heavily on legislative history in its
analysis. See 430 U.S. at 26-35.
71. The co-sponsor of the Williams Act, Senator Kuchel, noted that without
the legislation, shareholders would have to base their investment decisions
"solely on rumor, conjecture, and a market price," and that such decisions
might lead to the demise of the corporation. The proposal, stated Kuchel,
would "allow all to stand on an equal footing with respect to the availability of
significant facts about a tender offer" and would protect both "the investor and
the public interest." 113 CONG. REC. 9,338 (1967) (statement of Sen. Kuchel).
Senator Williams also emphasized the need to protect target shareholders, not-
ing that "[aill shareholders should have ... information so that they can make
informed investment decisions." Id. at 855 (statement of Sen. Williams).
Both the Senate and House reports contained a section explaining how the
Williams Act would operate, entitled "Protection of Investors." S. REP., supra
note 1, at 3; H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 2813. This section states that the bill "is designed to require full
and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors." Moreover, the title of the Act
identified it as "[a]n Act providing for full disclosure of corporate equity own-
ership of securities under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." Williams Act,
Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968).
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It is apparent that one of the "investment decisions" that
the Act protects is the target shareholder's decision to tender
shares.7 2 In summarizing section 14(e), the House and Senate
reports on the Williams Act asserted that the section applied to
"persons engaged in opposing tender offers or otherwise seek-
ing to influence the decision of investors." 73 The legislative his-
tory thus demonstrates that section 14(e) is an antifraud
provision for the benefit of target shareholders that allows
them to make fully informed investment decisions, one of
which is the tender decision itself.7 4
To protect the target shareholders fully, Congress must
have intended that they have the right to act under section
14(e).7 5 The arguments that the Court used in both Redington
and Transamerica to demonstrate the absence of such congres-
sional intent do not apply to target shareholder actions under
section 14(e). First, unlike section 17(a) in Redington,76 section
14(e) proscribes fraudulent conduct and thus, by its very lan-
72. Senator Williams noted that his bill would provide the information to
stockholders deciding "whether or not to accept a cash tender offer." 113 CONG.
REC. 855 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams). Testifying before the Senate
Subcommittee on Securities, Manuel F. Cohen, SEC chairman, stated that the
Williams Act would provide the SEC with "adequate tools to deal effectively
with the various techniques that have been developed, and are continuing to be
devised, to initiate or to prevent takeover bids." Sen. Hearings, supra note 6, at
16 (statement of Manuel F. Cohen).
73. S. REP., supra note 1, at 11; H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 11, reprinted in
1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2821.
74. To infer that Congress intended to provide target shareholders with a
cause of action under section 14(e), however, one must do more than show that
Congress wished to protect target shareholders. In Transamerica Mortgage Ad-
visors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979), for example, the Court concluded that
Congress intended the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 to protect the victims of
the fraudulent practices it prohibited, but refused to imply damage relief for
the plaintiffs because of opposing indications of congressional intent. See id.
See also supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
75. Professors William Painter and Carlos Israels both submitted written
statements to the Senate in which they expressly referred to the availability of
private relief. See infra note 89. Commenting before the Senate on the state of
the law prior to the enactment of his bill, Senator Williams also noted that de-
frauded shareholders "would obviously have recourse to the courts," although
many shareholders with valid claims would not litigate because of the expense
and time involved in such litigation. 113 CONG. REC. 855 (1967) (statement of
Sen. Williams). Senator Williams must have believed that his new bill allowed
defrauded shareholders to bring private causes of action under section 14(e) if
they were willing to invest their money and time. This interpretation is even
more convincing in light of the House report indicating that the Williams Act
would cost the government "very little" to administer, a comment suggesting
that Congress expected private litigants to bear responsibility for enforcing sec-
tion 14(e). H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 7, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 2817.
76. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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guage, suggests the need for a mechanism to enforce this pro-
scription. Second, unlike the acts discussed in Redington77 and
Transamerica,78 the Williams Act does not contain other provi-
sions explicitly creating private causes of action. Although sec-
tion 14(e) became part of the 1934 Act, which provides explicit
private causes of action for violatiois of some of its sections,
Congress passed the Williams Act in 1968 as a separate and dis-
tinct amendment. Since it was not enacted contemporaneously
with sections that provided for private relief, a court may not
infer, as the Redington court did with respect to section 17(a),
that Congress rejected a private right of action under section
14(e). 79
Finally, unlike the remedies for the violations in Reding-
tonO and Transamerica,8' the remedy existing for violation of
14(e) does not preclude a private remedy for target sharehold-
ers. As enacted in 1968, section 14(e) did not contain any ex-
press enforcement provisions. This strongly suggests that
when it enacted section 14(e), Congress expected the courts to
imply private relief as necessary to enforce the section's
prohibitions against misleading statements in connection with
any tender offer.82 Congress amended section 14(e) in 1970 by
expressly giving the SEC rulemaking authority to define and to
prescribe means to prevent fraudulent tender offer conduct.83
Since the amendment does not discuss means of enforcement,
this amendment does not necessarily imply that Congress re-
jected private causes of action. Moreover, Congress specifically
patterned the 1970 amendment after the language of section
77. See supra text accompanying note 37.
78. See supra text accompanying note 43.
79. In Transamerica, the Court inferred from the authorization of private
suits in previous securities laws, passed several years before the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, that Congress considered private relief in the latter Act.
444 U.S. at 20. Yet the Court in Transamerica also emphasized that Congress
had enacted, simultaneously with the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940, which again expressly created a private cause
of action. Id. Given the absence of securities legislation enacted contempora-
neously with the Williams Act, and the number of years that have passed since
the enactment of the 1934 Act, the previous securities laws providing for private
relief arguably should not suggest that Congress was unwilling to grant such
relief under section 14(e).
80. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
82. At least one commentator suggested that private litigation generally
fails as a method for enforcing the securities laws. See Frankel, supra note 46,
at 570-81. Even this commentator, however, admitted that investor compensa-
tion provides a legitimate rationale for permitting private relief. Id. at 581.
83. See supra note 23.
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15(c) (2) of the 1934 Act,84 a provision regulating securities
transactions in the over-the-counter markets and under which
federal courts had already implied private relief.85
The clear purpose of the statute, its legislative history, and
the inapplicability of the arguments used by the Court in Tran-
samerica and Redington to find no congressional intent to cre-
ate private causes of action demonstrate that a Williams Act
cause of action satisfies the requirements of the second Cort
factor. Congress intended to give target shareholders the right
to sue under section 14(e).
The third prong of the Cort test, which can also aid in de-
termining congressional intent, asks whether implying a pri-
vate action under section 14(e) is consistent with the legislative
scheme of the Williams Act. Although the Court generally ap-
proved of injunctive relief, the opinion in Piper v. Chris-Craft
Industries8 6 suggested that a damage action is not consistent
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (2) (1976).
85. Franklin Nat'l Bank v. LB. Meadows & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1339, 1343
(E.D.N.Y. 1970). The Supreme Court has suggested that in evaluating legisla-
tive action courts must take into account its contemporary legal context. "In
sum, it is not only appropriate but also realistic to presume that Congress was
thoroughly familiar with... important precedents ... and that it expected its
enactment to be interpreted in conformity with them." Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979). Since Congress patterned its amendment af-
ter the language of section 15(c) (2), courts may presume that Congress knew
that private relief was implied under this provision and, therefore, approved of
the implication of private relief under section 14(e).
This argument is strengthened by a liberal Supreme Court ruling that was
announced as this Note went to press. Merrfil Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v.
Curran, 50 U.S.L.W. 4457 (1982). In Curran, the Supreme Court considered
whether to imply private damage relief under antifraud provisions of the Com-
modity Exchange Act (CEA) after Congress in 1974 explicitly strengthened ad-
ministrative remedies under the CEA. Although the Court recognized that
such an implied action would not satisfy the Cort v. Ash test, since the Act does
not specify a protected class, id. at 4467, the 5-4 majority inferred the damage
action. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, noted that the "key" in determin-
ing whether to imply private relief is to focus on the state of the law at the time
Congress reenacts a statute. "When Congress acts in a statutory context in
which an implied remedy has already been recognized by the courts .... the
question is whether Congress intended to preserve the preexisting remedy."
Id. at 4464 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned that Congress intended to
"preserve" the pre-1974 implied remedies under the CEA, since Congress did
not eliminate such remedies by its 1974 legislation. Id. at 4465. Having con-
cluded that "the dispositive question of legislative intent" was resolved, the
Court stated that the remaining Cort factors were irrelevant. Id. at 4466.
The new Curran test would appear to be just as applicable in analyzing the
1970 amendment to section 14(e). Congress must have intended to preserve
pre-1970 implied actions under section 14(e), since Congress did not eliminate
such actions in the 1970 amendment.
86. The Court quoted Judge Friendly in Electronic Specialty Co. v. Inter-
national Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir. 1969), for the proposition that
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with the scheme of the Williams Act, because it would provide
little additional protection to investors, and the threat of mas-
sive damage awards might deter potentially beneficial tender
offers.87
A damage action is, however, consistent with the Williams
Act goal of preventing fraudulent acts in connection with
tender offers. The Chris-Craft majority's concern that the
threat of massive damage.awards might deter potentially bene-
ficial tender offers is unfounded; the removal of the damage
threat by the Chris-Craft decision did not cause a drastic in-
crease in the growth rate of tender offers. 88 Moreover, written
statements before the Senate Subcommittee on Securities re-
ferred to implied private causes of action for damages under
the Williams Act.89 Therefore, Congress knew of the potential
for implying damage relief under section 14(e) when it enacted
the provision.9 O
Under the final Cort factor, a court must determine
whether the private action is traditionally relegated to state
law. If the target's misrepresentations deterred takeover bid-
ders, a target shareholder might conceivably state a cause of
action under state law for interference with prospective eco-
nomic advantage. 91 Yet that tort requires a showing of intent to
in tender offer contests 'the time when relief can best be given" occurs during
the time appropriate for preliminary injunctive relief. 430 U.S. at 42.
87. Id. at 39-40.
88. Pitt, supra note 69, at 190.
89. Professor Carlos Israels's statement noted that "a private litigant could
seek similar relief [as under Borak] before or after the significant fact such as
the acceptance of his tender of securities." Sen. Hearings, supra note 6, at 67.
Professor William Painter referred to a private action for "injured investors" in
his written statement, and also referred to relief such as that in Borak. Id. at
140. The Chris-Craft Court found a problem with these written comments. The
Court contended that courts should accord written statements "little weight,"
430 U.S. at 31 n.20 (1977), and cited its opinion in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 204 n.24 (1976), for support. In Hochfelder, however, the Court's
concern arose because the SEC offered random statements that the legislative
opponents of the bill had inserted into the written record. The Court warned
that opponents overstate their case when they attempt to defeat allegedly unfa-
vorable legislation. Id. In the section 14(e) context, the statements of the two
professors supported the bill. Senator Williams himself recognized Professor
Painter's analysis. Sen. Hearings, supra note 6, at 128. The Court's rationale
for dismissing written comments thus does not apply to the statements of
Professors Israels and Painter.
90. One commentator has also asserted that denying target shareholders a
damage remedy for post-tender offer misconduct would render the Williams
Act a "snare and a delusion." Pitt, supra note 69, at 189, (quoting Baird v.
Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944)).
91. To state a cause of action for interference with prospective economic
advantage, the courts require a plaintiff to demonstrate: (1) the existence of a
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interfere. Since target management may violate section 14(e)
by a mere negligent failure to disclose material facts,92 it is
clear that the contemplated action, or at least an action based
on the negligent acts of target management during the post-
tender offer period, is not traditionally relegated to state law.
In addition, nothing in the legislative history of the Williams
Act indicates that target shareholders have traditionally looked
to state law for either injunctive or damage relief. The Cort
analysis thus fully supports the inference of both private in-
junctive and damage causes of action under section 14(e) on
behalf of target shareholders for post-tender offer misconduct
by target management.
2. Damage Relieffor Pre-Tender Offer Misconduct
Federal courts have not yet decided a case in which target
shareholders sued for damages under section 14(e), alleging
that they relied on management's pre-tender offer misconduct
in deciding whether to tender their shares.9 3 If, however,
courts are faced with this situation, they should imply private
damage relief under section 14(e).
The initial question is whether section 14(e) proscribes
pre-tender offer misconduct. This section arguably prohibits
only post-tender offer fraudulent practices, thus making the
question of who may sue for this misconduct irrelevant. The
language of section 14(e), however, suggests that it was di-
rected at both pre-tender offer and post-tender offer fraud. Sec-
tion 14(e) prohibits fraudulent conduct "in connection with"
tender offers. While only one court has considered this phrase
as it appears in section 14(e) 94, the Supreme Court has defined
valid business relation or expectancy (2) knowledge of the relationship or ex-
pectancy on the part of the interferer; (3) an intentional interference inducing
or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy; and
(4) resultant damage to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Thorne v. Elmore, 79 11. App. 3d
333, 345, 398 N.E.2d 837, 847 (1979). If, however, target management dissuades
shareholders from selling their stock, a misrepresentation action may lie, since
courts now limit the reach of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E.
441 (1931). See Rusch Factors v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D.R.L 1968); C. MOR-
Pis, Moius oN TORTS 319-28 (2d ed. 1980).
92. For a discussion of the requisite culpability a plaintiff must prove
under a private section 14(e) cause of action, see supra note 20.
93. The Second Circuit has intimated that courts should imply this cause
of action. See infra note 113 and accompanying text. Cf. SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d
784, 786 (2d Cir. 1943) (applying the proxy rules to letters written prior to the
time solicitation of proxies took place).
94. See O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1982 Current
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,443, at 92,632 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1982). For
a discussion of the case, see infra note 162.
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the phrase under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, which prohibits
fraudulent conduct "in connection with the sale or purchase of
any security."95 In Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life
& Casualty,9 6 Justice Douglas concluded that a deceptive prac-
tice need only "touch"9 7 a sale of securities to be "in connection
with" such a sale.9 8 By analogy, under section 14(e) a decep-
five practice should only have to "touch" a tender offer to be
"in connection with" such an offer. Pre-tender offer misconduct
by target management "touches" a tender offer because once
shareholders learn of a forthcoming tender offer, they will be-
gin to consider their options with respect to the tender offer.
Management's misrepresentations will surely affect these con-
siderations. Similarly, once a tender offer becomes effective,
the pre-tender offer misconduct will continue to influence a
shareholder's thinking and may ultimately affect the share-
holder's tender offer decision. 99
Other language of section 14(e) also suggests that this sec-
95. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
96. 404 U.S. 6 (1971). In Bankers Life, the state representative of the Man-
hattan Life Insurance Company brought a private action against defendants
who had attempted to embezzle corporate assets through a series of securities
transactions. The district court dismissed the section 10(b) claim by conclud-
ing that the theft did not affect the securities transactions, 300 F. Supp. 1083
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), and the Second Circuit affirmed, 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970).
The Supreme Court, however, reversed, concluding that the transactions were
"in connection with" a sale of securities. 404 U.S. at 13.
97. Most federal courts interpret the Bankers Life test broadly. See Ketch-
um v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1026 (3d Cir. 1977); see, e.g., Jannes v. Microwave
Communications, Inc., 461 F.2d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 1972); Drachman v. Harvey, 453
F.2d 722, 736-38 (2d Cir. 1972). The Fifth Circuit, however, in Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974), suggested
that the standard "be fleshed out by a cautious case-by-case approach." Id. at
595. A plaintiff may prove that a deceptive practice "touches" a sale if the ille-
gal manipulation and the sale constitute part of the same fraudulent scheme.
Alley v. Miramon, 614 F.2d 1372; 1378 n.11 (5th Cir. 1980). The Third Circuit also
adopted a more narrow case-by-case approach. See Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d
1022, 1027 (3d Cir. 1977).
98. 404 U.S. at 12-13. Cf. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 773 n.4
(1979) (construed the use of the term "in" instead of "in connection with").
99. In Applied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), a federal district court implied private injunctive relief for pre-
tender offer misconduct under section 14(e), using this reasoning-
Although the shareholders might not in the pre-offer period be faced
with a present decision whether to exchange their stock in the target
corporation, statements and actions of the target corporation and the
offeror during this period clearly have the capacity to affect any future
decision and should thus fall within the purview of the statute. This is
especially so when, as here, the competing parties by their acts and
conduct clearly indicate that in fact they deem the proposal of an ex-
change offer to be genuine.
Id. at 1154. The Fifth Circuit echoed this analysis in SEC v. Mize, 615 F.2d 1046,
1054-55 (5th Cir. 1980).
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tion proscribes pre-tender offer fraudulent practices. In addi-
tion to governing conduct "in connection with" a tender offer,
section 14(e) governs conduct "in connection with any solicita-
tion of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such
offer."100 At the time Congress passed the Williams Act, rule
14a-9101 prohibited the fraudulent solicitation of proxies. Con-
gress knew of existing interpretations of the word "solicitation"
under this rule when it included the word in section 14(e).102
Under the proxy law, letters sent to shareholders prior to for-
mal proxy request are "solicitations" if the communicator
writes "under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in
the procurement, withholding, or revocation of a proxy." 03
Just as pre-proxy statements may be "solicitations" under rule
14a-9, pre-tender offer statements should be "solicitations"
under section 14(e) if the circumstances indicate that a tender
offer will likely be made.104
The legislative history of section 14(e) also indicates that
Congress intended to include pre-tender offer misconduct
within its scope. The House and Senate reports on the Wil-
liams Act observed that section 14(e) "would affirm the fact
that persons engaged in . . . opposing tender offers . . . are
under an obligation to make full disclosure of material informa-
tion to those with whom they deal."105 Clearly, rejecting a pro-
posed tender offer constitutes behavior in the class of
"opposing" an offer. As one federal district court has noted,
"[there is no apparent reason.., why a recommendation to
reject a proposed tender offer is not also a recommendation to
'reject a tender offer.' "106 Thus, both the language and the leg-
100. See supra note 16.
101. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1981).
102. SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen informed the Senate Subcommittee
on Securities that the Williams Act had a close 'relationship to existing provi-
sions of the Exchange Act regulating solicitation of proxies." Sen. Hearings,
supra note 6, at 16 (emphasis added).
103. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 600 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974). See also Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 696
(2d Cir. 1966); SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1943).
104. In the context of an action for injunctive relief under section 14(e), one
court has enjoined pre-tender offer misconduct in connection with an "overall
plan" to make a tender offer. ICM Realty v. Cabot, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,585, at 96,048 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 1974).
105. S. REP., supra note 1, at 11; H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 11, reprinted in
1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2821.
106. Lewis v. McGraw, 495 F. Supp. 27, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aO'd, 619 F.2d 192
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980) (quoting Applied Digital Data Sys. v.
Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
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islative history indicate that section 14(e) proscribes pre-tender
offer fraudulent conduct.
Before implying private damage relief for this misconduct,
however, a court must determine that Congress intended to
create a cause of action for target shareholders who relied on
this misconduct in making their tender offer decisions. As pre-
viously indicated, 0 7 federal courts should and do use the four
Cort factors to imply private damage relief for target share-
holders if the post-tender offer misrepresentations of target
management adversely affect their tender decisions. There is
very little difference between implying damage relief for inves-
tors who, after facing a tender offer, sue for post-tender offer
misconduct and implying damage relief for investors who, after
facing a tender offer, sue for pre-tender offer misconduct. The
applicability of the four Cort factors does not change: the
plaintiffs are still members of the especial class; 08 all the in-
dicators of congressional intent, which suggest that section
14(e) includes a private cause of action to protect shareholders'
tender decisions, are unaffected; 0 9 a damage action in the con-
text of pre-tender offer misconduct is as consistent with the
scheme of the Act as a damage action in the context of post-
tender offer misconduct;" 0 and the action is not typically rele-
gated to state law."'
This analysis, equating the two actions, is reasonable. Both
sets of investors seek compensation for the adverse effect that
target management's fraud had upon their decisions to tender
their shares. The only difference between the two causes of ac-
tion is the time at which the misrepresentation took place.
This brief time difference should not alter the shareholder's
remedies, because pre-tender offer misrepresentations, like
post-tender offer misrepresentations, can cause one of the
harms that Congress designed section 14(e) to prevent-a
107. See supra text accompanying notes 63-92.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
109. The goal of section 14(e), to insure that a shareholder may make a fully
informed investment decision, see supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text,
clearly remains. The comments of the section's proponents, see supra note 75,
are not limited to actions based on post-tender offer misconduct. And the re-
sponses to the three arguments used in Redington and Transamerica, see
supra text accompanying notes 76-85, also apply to actions based on both pre-
tender offer and post-tender offer fraudulent conduct.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
111. Target management can be as negligent in pre-tender offer conduct as




shareholder's uninformed tender offer decision.112
3. Injunctive Relieffor Pre-Tender Offer Misconduct
Federal courts have not yet decided a case in which target
shareholders sued under section 14(e) for injunctive relief for
pre-tender offer violations.113 If this Note's analysis is correct, a
court should also imply a cause of action in such a case; section
14(e) covers pre-tender offer misconduct,114 and the sharehold-
ers seek to prevent uninformed tender decisions, one of the
goals of the Williams Act."15 Yet, because the action is decided
before the tender offer becomes effective, the tender offer may
still be withdrawn. Thus, management's misconduct may never
affect a shareholder's tender decision.1 6 It is equitable, how-
ever, for courts to enjoin target management's misconduct be-
cause failure to enjoin management may permit the tender
offer to become effective despite management's misleading
statements. The misleading statements may, however, affect an
investor's later decision to tender, even though the statements
were made before the tender offer was operative.".7 To carry
out the purpose of section 14(e), courts must act on the as-
sumption that the tender offer will take effect, and thus halt the
misconduct whenever it occurs.1 1 8
Concluding that tender offerors and target management
112. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. In Lewis v. McGraw, 619
F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980), the Second Circuit stated
that courts should imply private damage relief after a tender offer takes effect
for shareholders who sue for pre-tender offer misconduct. Id. at 195 (dicta).
The court noted that a contrary decision would permit circumvention of the se-
curities laws by allowing target management to misrepresent its position until
a tender offer took effect. This would circumvent the Williams Act's purpose of
providing truthful information to shareholders confronted with a decision to
tender their shares. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
113. Two circuit courts of appeals have recognized the validity of this action
in dicta. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 287 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981); Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980). Courts have implied this action for other parties. See
infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text. The SEC has recently authorized its
General Counsel to submit a brief as amicus curiae in cases arising under the
Williams Act urging that a district court has authority to order equitable relief.
SEC Litigation Release No. 9625, Mar. 23, 1982, reprinted in [1982 Current
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,200, at 84,950.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 94-106.
115. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
116. For a discussion of whether it is necessary for the action to be based
on the tender decision, see infra notes 124-72.
117. See supra note 99 and accompanying text
118. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. The Sixth Circuit has rec-
ognized that "[a] preliminary injunction against manipulative practices would
be the only means of preserving the free, informed choice of shareholders that
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can best uncover potential misrepresentations," 9 federal courts
have permitted these parties to sue for injunctive relief under
section 14(e) for misleading pre-tender offer misconduct.120 It
logically follows, therefore, that target shareholders, the in-
tended beneficiaries of the Williams Act,121 should have an im-
plied right of action for injunctive relief'122 if they can
demonstrate that misleading pre-tender offer statements have
the probable potential to harm their later tender decisions.123
C.' IMPLYING SECTION 14(E) PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR
DAMAGES TO PROTECT SHAREHOLDER'S NON-TENDER
OFFER DECISIONS
This Note has demonstrated that section 14(e) proscribes
pre-tender offer fraudulent practices.124 The problem lies in de-
termining the harms that Congress sought to alleviate when it
forbade such conduct. As discussed above, Congress prohib-
the Williams Act was designed to protect." Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669
F.2d 366, 371 (6th Cir. 1981). See also supra note 86.
119. The Sixth Circuit has stated
In a tender offer battle, events occur with explosive speed and require
immediate response by a party seeking to enjoin the unlawful conduct.
Issues such as incomplete disclosure and manipulative practices can
only be effectively spotted and argued by parties with complete knowl-
edge of the target, its business, and others in the industry. The tender
offeror has frequently made intensive investigations before deciding to
commence its offer and may often be the only party with enough
knowledge and awareness to identify nondisclosure or manipulative
practices in time to obtain a preliminary injunction.
Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 371 (6th Cir. 1981).
120. Target management was allowed to sue in ICM Realty v. Cabot, [1973-
1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,585 at 96,048 (S.D.N.Y. June
6, 1974). Courts allowed tender offerors to sue for injunctive relief in Applied
Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,863, at 91,138 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976); and Crane Co. v. Anaconda
Co., 411 F. Supp. 1208, 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
121. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
122. The court in Lewis v. McGraw stated that "[i]njunctive relief... may
be available to restrain or correct misleading statements made by target man-
agement during the period preceding a tender offer where it appears that such
an offer is likely, and that reliance upon the statements at issue is probable
under the circumstances." 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir.) (dicta), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 951 (1980).
123. Federal courts grant preliminary injunctions on one of two grounds.
Courts may grant relief if plaintiffs demonstrate probable success on the merits
and possible irreparable damage if the injunction fails to issue. Sonesta Int'l
Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assoc., 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 1973). Courts may
also provide injunctive relief if plaintiffs demonstrate that there are serious
questions concerning the merits making their claims fair grounds for litigation,
and the balance of hardships tip decidedly toward the parties requesting the
preliminary relief. Gulf & Western Indus. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d
687, 692-93 (2d Cir. 1973).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 94-106.
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ited pre-tender offer misconduct in part to ensure that target
shareholders will not make misinformed tender offer deci-
sions.125 It is arguable that Congress also prohibited such con-
duct to ensure that target shareholders will not make
misinformed decisions concerning whether to sell their shares
in the market before a tender offer takes effect.126 Two courts
have expressly considered whether to imply a cause of action
for shareholders whose claims rest on their pre-tender offer de-
cisions not to sell their shares on the open market. In Berman
v. Gerber Products,127 a federal district court recognized this
cause of action, although its analysis was brief.128 In Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., the Seventh Circuit held that it would
not imply a remedy for shareholders who sue on these
grounds.129
In Panter, the offeror, Carter Hawley Hale (CHH), with-
drew its tender offer for the shares of the target company, Mar-
shall Field, before the tender offer took effect.130 Marshall Field
shareholders asserted that Marshall Field had made misrepre-
sentations during the pre-tender offer period and sued under
section 14(e), predicating their damage action on two grounds.
The court dismissed the first claim, that Marshall Field's mis-
representation had caused them to lose the opportunity to
tender their shares to CHH,'3' holding that the plaintiffs did
125. See supra text accompanying notes 107-12.
126. The Supreme Court's suggestion in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S.
1, 35 (1977), that the Williams Act solely protects investors facing a tender offer,
does not preclude this cause of action. Read in context, Chief Justice Burger's
opinion simply made a broad distinction between takeover bidders regulated
by the Act and shareholders who, as public investors, gain the protection of the
disclosure and antifraud provisions. Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 817
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
127. 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
128. Id. at 1325.
129. 646 F.2d 271, 285-87 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981).
130. CHH, the parent company of Neiman-Marcus department stores, made
a public proposal to exchange CHH stock and cash for Marshall Field stock.
CHH filed the appropriate documents with the SEC announcing the proposed
tender offer. Marshall Field responded to the proposal by issuing press re-
leases stating the company's strong fiscal position as an independent corpora-
tion. The company also began an expansion program, including a move to open
a store in a Houston shopping center already containing a Neiman-Marcus
store, raising antitrust problems for CHH. In response to Marshall Field's ac-
tion, CHH withdrew its proposal before it became effective, stating that "the ex-
pansion program announced by Marshall Field... has created sufficient doubt
about Marshall Field's earning potential to make the offer no longer in the best
interest of Carter Hawley Hale's shareholders." Id. at 281.
131. Id. at 283. Shareholders in a similar situation had raised this argument
in a case decided just prior to Panter. See Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 194
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980). Both the shareholders in Panter and
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not rely on any alleged misrepresentations because the tender
offer never took place.132 The court also refused to imply a
cause of action under section 14(e) for the second claim,133 that
in reliance on Marshall Field's misstatements about the
strength of CHH, the plaintiffs failed to sell in the open market
at the high price then available.3 4 It based this holding on the
the shareholders in Lewis argued that the target's misconduct caused them to
lose the opportunity to tender their shares to the offeror at a premium over the
market price.
132. 646 F.2d at 283. The Lewis court had earlier rejected this argument for
the same reason. 619 F.2d at 195. This holding is clearly correct. Under section
14(e), the plaintiffs must prove that they acted in reliance on the defendant's
misrepresentations. See supra text accompanying note 21. In their lost oppor-
tunity argument, the shareholders never contended that they acted, refused to
act, or made any decision based on the target's misconduct. Thus, there was no
reliance by the shareholders. For a discussion of the Lewis case, see Note,
supra note 20, at 1005-11.
133. 646 F.2d at 285. In contrast, the district court in Panter held that sec-
tion 14(e) applies to conduct once a bidder has made a public announcement of
an intention to make a tender offer. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co', 486 F. Supp.
1168, 1188 (N.D. Ill. 1980), afj'd, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658
(1981). The district court concluded, however, that CHH's public announce-
ment did not qualify as a public announcement of an intention to make an of-
fer. Id. at 1190. CHH's proposal was subject by law to SEC approval, and
subject by the proposal to the condition that large CHH shareholders dissent-
ing to the acquisition program could redeem their shares. Since CHH neither
sought SEC approval nor solicited dissentions among its large shareholders in
the time after announcing its proposal, but prior to withdrawing it, the court
reasoned that CHH had no intention of making a tender offer. Id. at 1191.
134. Prior to the public announcement by CHH of its proposal, Marshall
Field's stock traded in the open market at twenty-two dollars. After the public
announcement, and before CHH withdrew its proposal, Marshall Field's stock
reached as high as thirty-four dollars. 646 F.2d at 279-80. After CiH withdrew
its proposed exchange offer, the price of Marshall Field's stock fell to nineteen
dollars, below the prepublic announcement price. Id. at 281.
Unlike the plaintiff's first argument, reliance is possible under this claim.
Shareholders can sell or refuse to sell their shares in actual reliance upon tar-
get management's statements. Even shareholders who trade in the market and
do not act in actual reliance can claim reliance based on the "fraud in the mar-
ket theory." This theory, which arose in lOb-5 actions, allows plaintiffs to sat-
isfy the reliance requirement if they prove that the defendant's conduct
affected the integrity of the market price. See, e.g., Ross v. A.H. Robbins Co.,
607 F.2d 545, 553 (2d Cir. 1979); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir.
1975). The Fifth Circuit, however, has a more limited perspective. See Shores
v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 469 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Note, The Reliance Require-
ment in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 86 HAnv. L. REv. 584, 592-96
(1975). Cf. O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1982 Current
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,443, at 92,632 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1982)
(court distinguished Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 931 (1980), and held that reliance was possible when option traders sold
call options in a target company's stock just prior to the public announcement
of a tender offer proposal, even though the bidder subsequently abandoned its
plan). For a discussion of the O'Connor case, see infra note 162.
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legislative history of the Williams Act,35 the Act's focus on de-
cisions that must be made under time pressure,136 and the
availability of injunctive relief for target shareholders.137To ascertain whether Congress intended to allow target
shareholders to sue for adversely affected non-tender offer de-
cisions, the central inquiry in implying a private cause of ac-
tion,138 a court should again apply the four Cort factors.139 The
target shareholders clearly belong to the class for whose espe-
cial benefit Congress passed section 14(e) 4 0 The second Cort
factor, legislative intent, does not favor this private cause of ac-
tion as strongly. In refusing to imply a remedy for sharehold-
ers who claim damages resulting from their pre-tender offer
decisions to sell on the open market, the Panter court noted
that one of the Act's aims was to protect a shareholder's tender
decision.141 There are many indications, however, that Con-
gress intended to do more than just provide accurate informa-
tion to allow shareholders to make wise decisions in
considering whether to tender their shares.142
The legislative history of section 14(e) is replete with com-
ments noting that the section was designed to insure informed
"investment decisions." 43 One of these "investment decisions"
135. 646 F.2d at 285-86. The court quoted the remarks of Senator Williams
and Manuel F. Cohen.
136. Id. at 286. The court argued that a shareholder's pre-tender offer deci-
sion to sell on the market is not made under time pressure.
137. Id. at 286-87. The court also noted the general reluctance of the
Supreme Court to imply causes of action under the federal securities laws. Id.
at 286.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
139. As noted above, see supra note 51 and accompanying text, the Cort fac-
tors are helpful in analyzing congressional intent.
140. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
141. "'In the rather common situation where existing management or third
parties contest a tender offer, shareholders may be exposed to a bewildering
variety of conflicting appeals and arguments designed to persuade them either
to accept or to reject the tender offer.' 646 F.2d at 285 (113 CONG. REc. 855-56
(1967) (statement of Sen. Williams)).
The court quoted several of Mr. Cohen's statements. 646 F.2d at 286. It
noted, for example, that the SEC chairman said "'the bill is designed, first, to
provide those who receive a tender offer with information adequate to an in-
formed decision whether or not to accept.' Id. at 286.
142. The quotation of Senator Williams, see supra note 141, does not suggest
which harms Congress sought to alleviate in directing section 14(e) at "conflict-
ing appeals and arguments." Since the "conflicting" statements might cause an
erroneous pre-tender offer decision, just as they might cause an erroneous
tender decision, the quotation can also be read as supporting shareholders'
causes of action based on their decisions not to sell their shares in the market
before the offer takes effect. The quotation of Manuel F. Cohen, see supra note
141, lists only one of the purposes of the Williams Act.
143. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. Testifying before the
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is the decision whether to tender one's shares, and one facet of
this decision is whether to sell one's shares on the open market
after the tender offer takes effect.'44 This latter choice is virtu-
ally identical to the choice which an investor faces in deciding
whether to sell on the open market before the tender offer
takes effect. 14 5 In both cases, a target shareholder confronts a
market price that has risen above the normal trading price be-
cause of the tender offer or the announcement of a proposed
tender offer.'4 In both cases, a shareholder may fail to take ad-
vantage of this increased price in reliance upon the target man-
agement's misrepresentations. And in both cases, the
shareholders may suffer great financial loss because of their
poor investment decisions. 4 7
The Panter court attempted to distinguish between these
pre-tender and post-tender offer decisions on the basis of the
pressures imposed on the shareholder. The court argued that
House Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance on the House version of the
Williams Act, SEC chairman Manuel F. Cohen noted that the House and Sen-
ate bills have the purpose "solely to provide information to investors so that
they can arrive at an informed investment decision." Takeover Bids: Hearings
on H.R. 14475 and S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 17
(1968) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Hearings].
144. The shareholder... may also sell his shares in the market or hold
them and hope for the best. Without knowledge of who the bidder is
and what he plans to do, the shareholder cannot reach an informed de-
cision. He is forced to take a chance. For no matter what he does, he
does it without adequate information to enable him to decide rationally
what is the best possible course of action.
S. REP., supra note 1, at 2; H.IL REP., supra note 1, at 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & An. NEWS at 2812.
145. Judge Cudahy stated in his Panter dissent that "[a] shareholder, who,
in the face of a proposed tender offer elects not to sell into the market in reli-
ance on management's misleading statements is in a position similar to that of
a shareholder who elects not to tender to the bidder in reliance upon such
statements." 646 F.2d at 312 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
146. Stock prices often rise upon public announcement of a tender offer pro-
posaL The recent tender offer acquisition by Du Pont of controlling interest in
Conoco Oil provides a typical example. In early May 1981, before Dome Petro-
leum initially made a tender bid for Conoco stock, Conoco traded in the open
market slightly under fifty dollars. By early August 1981, after Seagram, Du
Pont, and Mobil had announced separate offers for Conoco stock, Conoco
shares traded as high as ninety-six dollars. Smith, The Making of the
Megamerger, FORTUNE, Sept. 7, 1981, at 61.
147. During the tender offer battle for Marshall Field & Co., before the
tender offer was scheduled to take effect, investors traded 7,000,000 of the com-
pany's 9,000,000 shares. Losses after CHH withdrew its tender offer proposal
were estimated to exceed $100,000,000. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1978, § F, at 15, coL
1. The Panter shareholder's benefit-of-the-bargain damage calculation, based
on C-HH's aborted attempt to take over Marshall Field & Co., exceeded
$200,000,000. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 283 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981).
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the Williams Act applies only to situations in which the share-
holders are pressured to "make a hasty, ill-considered decision
to sell their shares" 4 8 to the tender offeror at some premium
over the market price. Shareholders who must choose whether
to sell their shares on the market before the tender offer takes
effect do not face this pressure because they do not encounter
a deadline, and they do not have the opportunity to sell their
shares at a premium over the market price.149 Thus, the court
concluded that the Williams Act does not give a private remedy
to these shareholders.
Both of these contentions are incorrect. First, section 14(e)
does not necessarily operate only in pressure-filled situations.
The court relied upon cases decided under section 14(d),150 and
ignored the substantive differences between that section and
section 14(e). Section 14(d) contains a number of provisions
that apply only if a tender offer is made.'15 These provisions
thus are effective only in cases in which there is pressure on
shareholders, one component of a tender offer. In contrast, sec-
tion 14(e) applies in a broader range of circumstances; 5 2 it
prohibits pre-tender offer as well as post-tender offer miscon-
duct,153 and is thus not restricted solely to tender offer con-
texts. One cannot, therefore, infer that the purposes of section
14(d) are identical to the purposes of section 14(e).
A conclusion that Congress intended section 14(e) to be ef-
fective only in cases in which shareholders face pressure does
148. 646 F.2d at 286.
149. Id.
150. The court cited Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584
F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d Cir. 1978); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 824-25
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); and S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1126-27
(D. Mass. 1978).
151. Section 14(d)(5), for example, provides that a shareholder who has
tendered securities to an offeror may withdraw the securities deposited within
seven days of publication or delivery to the shareholder of the tender offer. 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d) (5) (1976). Section 14(d) (1) makes it unlawful to make a tender
offer "unless at the time copies of the offer... are first published ... such per-
son making the offer has filed with the Commission" a statement disclosing cer-
tain information about the tender offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1) (1976).
152. One of the opinions which the Panter court cited to support this argu-
ment noted the differences between section 14(d) and section 14(e). "Although
broad and remedial interpretations of the Act may create no problems insofar
as the antifraud provisions of subsection (e) of section 78n are concerned, this
may not be true with regard to subsections (d) (5)-(d) (7)." Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d Cir. 1978). Cf. Indiana
Nat'l Bank v. Mobil Oil Corp., 578 F.2d 180, 185 n.10 (7th Cir. 1978) ("Indeed, it is
questionable whether § 14(e) has any application to the mechanics of a tender
offer.").
153. See supra text accompanying notes 94-106.
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not preclude application of section 14(e) to shareholder deci-
sions not to sell their shares before the tender offer takes ef-
fect; in those instances, shareholders face a great deal of
pressure. Contrary to the Panter court's assertion, 5 4 once an
offeror proposes a tender offer, the price of the stock begins to
rise.155 Moreover, since an offeror may withdraw a tender offer
at any time, causing the stock price to return to its normal
level, shareholders must contend with pressures that result
from this unknown deadline.156 Shareholders face the uncer-
tainty of whether to sell at the current inflated price, to wait
and hope the market price continues to climb, to wait and hope
the offer is made so that they may tender their shares, or to re-
tain their shares despite the attractive offers. These pressures,
combined with a target management's misrepresentations, are
at least as compelling as the pressures associated with an effec-
tive tender offer. Thus even a narrow interpretation of Con-
gress's intentions in passing section 14(e) would permit the
implication of a cause of action for shareholders who make pre-
tender offer decisions not to sell their shares on the market.
Legislative history reveals that Congress wished to "avoid
tipping the balance of regulation . . . in favor of manage-
ment."'5 7 If section 14(e) is not extended to cover shareholder
pre-tender offer decisions, target corporations may freely en-
gage in deceptive practices to defeat a proposed tender offer.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 148-49.
155. See supra notes 134, 146 and accompanying text. Donald L. Calvin,
Vice President of the New York Stock Exchange, in testimony before a House
subcommittee referred to the increase in the price of a stock that would result
from public knowledge of a proposed tender offer. Calvin objected to the
House of Representative's version of the Williams Act, which would have re-
quired an offeror to disclose confidentially to the SEC the offeror's intention to
make a tender offer five days prior to making a public announcement.
If word of the impending offer becomes public, the price of the stock
will rise toward the expected tender offer price. Thus, the primary in-
ducement to stockholders-an offer to purchase their shares at an at-
tractive price above the market-is lost, and the offeror may be forced
to abandon its plans or to raise the offer to a still higher price.
H.R. Hearings, supra note 143, at 44.
156. The SEC has noted that,
once a tender offer proposal is publicly announced, market prices rise
and public investors are confronted with an immediate investment de-
cision: to sell shares they own into the market at the higher price be-
ing offered by arbitrageurs in response the announcement, or to retain
those shares (or purchase shares) in anticipation they will be given an
opportunity to tender to the bidder.
Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae at 21, Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d
271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981).
157. S. REP., supra note 1, at 3; H.L REP., supra note 1, at 4, reprinted in
1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2813.
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As long as target management forces an offeror to withdraw its
proposal before its effective date,158 management will avoid all
federal liability for its deceptive practices, 5 9 tipping the bal-
ance of regulation far in management's favor. In Berman v.
Gerber Products,160 the district court recognized that this result
frustrates Congress's intent in enacting section 14(e)161 and
noted that section 14(e) extends to protect target shareholders
who do not dispose of their stock in the open market before the
bidder withdraws its proposal.162
158. The dissent in Panter noted-
The type of rule which the majority advocates [limiting section 14(e)
liability to exclude situations where the bidder withdraws a tender of-
fer proposal prior to the offer's effective date] is simply an invitation to
make whatever claims and assertions may be expedient to force with-
drawal of an offer. Management could speak without restraint knowing
that once withdrawal is forced there is no Securities Act liability for
deception practiced before withdrawal took place.
646 F.2d at 310 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). The SEC believes that the Panter rul-
ing might lead incumbent management, faced with a hostile tender offer propo-
sal, to make false public representations grossly overstating the value of the
target's shares, causing a sharp rise in the target's stock price, and forcing the
hostile bidder to abandon its proposal, because a tender offer would then be too
expensive to complete. Memorandum of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, On Petitions
for Rehearing and Suggestions for Rehearing en banc at 8 n.7, Panter v. Mar-
shall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981).
159. If target management suffers no liability under section 14(e) for its de-
ception in fighting potential tender offer bidders, target management can en-
gage in any conduct not illegal under state law. State law often provides the
opportunity to sue target management for a breach in fiduciary duty on the the-
ory that, once a plaintiff proves that a director has an interest in a transaction
at issue, the director must prove that the transaction was fair and reasonable to
the corporation. Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir.
1980). In Panter, the plaintiffs alleged that the independence of several of Mar-
shall Field's directors was questionable. 646 F.2d at 294-95. The plaintiffs thus
claimed that Marshall Field's management must justify its actions with respect
to CHH's tender offer proposal The Seventh Circuit held, as a matter of law,
that Marshall Field management's reasonable reliance on its antitrust counsel's
advice justified all of Marshall Field's actions. Id. at 297. Consequently, if tar-
get management engages competent counsel, the target may, under both state
and federal law, freely exercise its power to defeat a proposed tender offer.
160. 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
161. Id. at 1325. The court implied a right for target shareholders to sue tar-
get management for fraudulent practices leading the offeror to withdraw its
proposal. Id. The court ultimately dismissed the plaintiff's claims, however,
because the plaintiff did not prove the materiality of the omitted matter. Id. at
1329.
162. Id. at 1325. The court noted that it is "essential for the investing public
at large ... to possess knowledge of all material facts as soon as possible after
the announcement [of a proposed] tender offer" so that any trading thereafter
taking place would not be based on false rumors. Id. at 1316.
In an analogous context, the Federal District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York also held that section 14(e) protects a target shareholder's
decision to sell in the open market after the public announcement of a tender
offer proposal, even if the bidder subsequently abandons its plan. O'Connor &
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An analysis of the third Cort factor suggests that an im-
plied cause of action for damages is consistent with the scheme
of the Williams Act. If the Act was intended to protect share-
holders from making erroneous investment decisions, including
the decision whether to sell before the tender offer takes effect,
then, to protect this design, one must prefer a damage action
over injunctive relief.
Although injunctive relief would require target manage-
ment to correct misrepresentations immediately, reducing the
potential burden of litigation arising from shareholder losses
due to target management's allegedly fraudulent statements or
deeds,l63 courts must imply a damage remedy for shareholders
against target management if they wish to comply with the
scheme of the Williams Act. Injunctive relief alone is insuffi-
cient for three reasons. First, target shareholders probably do
not have access to the information necessary to enjoin pre-
tender offer misconduct. Because the events surrounding a
tender offer occur so rapidly, only target management or the
takeover bidder can likely recognize deceptive practices in time
to gain pre-tender offer injunctive relief.164 The entire premise
of the Williams Act is that shareholders need complete disclo-
sure, because investors cannot otherwise gain access to such
information. If target management acts fraudulently, it cer-
tainly will not enjoin its own conduct. Only the offeror may
know the actual truth, and it also may choose not to invest the
time and expense necessary to enjoin target management's
conduct. Injunctive relief thus becomes an empty remedy for
target shareholders.
Even if target shareholders do gain access to the informa-
Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1982 Current Binder] FED. SEC, L. REP.
(CCH) 98,443, at 92,631 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1982). Rejecting the defense that
section 14(e) did not proscribe trading on inside information of a prospective
tender offer when the tender offer never takes place, Judge Lasker concluded:
[T]he alleged failure to disclose the impending announcement of the
tender offer proposal worked to deny the target investor on [sic] the
relevant information on which to decide whether to sell his shares in
the same manner as fraudulent conduct operates when an offer has al-
ready been publicly announced ....
Since the insiders' sole purpose in effecting the trades ... would
have been to capitalize on the pending tender offer proposal, the al-
leged fraud was "in connection with a tender offer" under § 14(e) re-
gardless of whether the offer actually became effective.
Id.
163. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 287 (7th Cir.), cert de-
nied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981); Electronic Speciality Co. v. International Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir. 1979).
164. See supra note 119.
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tion necessary to enjoin target management, courts may well
refuse to grant a preliminary injunction. In Electronic Spe-
cialty Co. v. International Controls Corp.,165 for example, the
district court denied preliminary relief and held a full trial on
the merits.166 A damage remedy provides a necessary backup
if a court denies injunctive relief.
The final concern with injunctive relief is that an injunction
cannot compensate shareholders for losses they have already
incurred. If a target's deceptive statements lead an offeror to
withdraw its proposal, a successful injunction will only force
the target management to make complete disclosure. It may
not convince the potential offeror that the public would ignore
the prior misrepresentations and find the renewed tender offer
in the best interest of the two companies.16 7 A tender opportu-
nity may therefore be irretrievably lost. If this happens, the
shareholders who relied on the target management's fraudulent
assurances, refusing to take advantage of the increased market
price that existed while the offeror still publicly intended to
make a tender offer, will receive no compensation unless they
can sue for damages.168 Under normal circumstances, investors
assume certain financial risks by placing funds in the securities
market and should bear the burden of normal fluctuations in
market prices.16 9 The Williams Act, however, was passed to
prevent fraudulent conduct that exposes shareholders to risks
that Congress did not intend them to bear. 7 0 Thus, a damage
165. 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1979).
166. Id. at 943-44. For a discussion of the standards for granting a prelimi-
nary injunction, see supra note 123.
167. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Prelimi-
nary Injunction at 15, Applied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F.
Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
168. For an example of the large damages that shareholders may suffer, see
supra note 147.
169. The protections of the Williams Act do not extend to cover open mar-
ket stock purchases. See Water & Wall Assoc. v. American Consumer Indus.,
[1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,943, at 93,759 (D.N.J. Apr.
19, 1973). When introducing the bill on the Senate floor, Senator Williams made
a clear distinction between private acquisitions of stock and transactions coy-'
ered by his bill:
Substantial open market or privately negotiated purchases of shares
may... relate to shifts in control of which investors should be aware.
While some people might say that this information should be filed
before the securities are acquired, disclosure after the transaction
avoids upsetting the free and open auction market where buyer and
seller normally do not disclose the extent of their interest and avoids
prematurely disclosing the terms of privately negotiated transactions.
113 CONG. REC. 856 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
170. The competence and integrity of a company's management, and of
the persons who seek management positions, are of vital importance to
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action for losses resulting from such conduct is consistent with
the scheme of the Williams Act.171
The analysis of the fourth Cort factor, whether the cause of
action is traditionally relegated to state law, parallels the analy-
sis of this factor in the context of post-tender offer damage ac-
tions; state law has no action that is comparable to section
14(e).172 Thus, considering the four Cort factors, and the strong
stockholders. Secrecy in this area is inconsistent with the expectations
of the people who invest in the securities of publicly held corporations
and impairs public confidence in securities as a medium of investment.
S. REP., supra note 1, at 2; H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2812.
171. The Supreme Court has said that implied damage actions are not con-
sistent with the scheme of section 14(e) if they are financially detrimental to
target shareholders. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 39 (1977). One com-
mentator has observed that under the Chris-Craft analysis, the Supreme Court
might deny a cause of action for target shareholders unless the trial court en-
tered judgment only against target management personally. This commentator
argues that if the target company indemnified the directors, the company
would suffer a loss that would ultimately be to the shareholders' detriment.
Pitt, supra note 69, at 189. Yet, if only target directors were liable for their mis-
representations, the entire wealth of the directors would not make the target
shareholders whole. One solution which fully compensates shareholders, and
also prevents the target company from bearing the loss, would require all com-
panies to carry liability insurance to cover potential damage judgments under
section 14(e). Seventy-eight percent of United States companies already carry
insurance to cover misrepresentations made by company directors. Burne,
Covering the Cost of Director Liability, 34 INT'L MGMT. 35, 35 (1979). Companies
would spread the cost of such insurance among all investors in the stock mar-
ket. If the damage award against a target company exceeded the cost of insur-
ance premiums, target shareholders would benefit financially from a damage
award levied against target directors personally.
Pitt, however, may not have correctly analyzed the implications of Chris-
Craft. Unless the market price of the target's stock falls more proportionally
per share than the amount of the damage award, target shareholders will
benefit financially from a damage award levied directly against the target. The
market value of the target's stock arguably will not fall if the damage award
does not affect the target's future dividend policy. See W. LEWELLEN, COST OF
CAPrrAL 88-89 (1969). If, for example, a target pays a damage judgment from a
reserve of marketable securities, the corporation's earning potential may not
change, and thus the future dividend policy might also not change. If, on the
other hand, the present "forced dividend" leads the target to announce that fu-
ture dividends will suffer, the market price of the stock may fall. Even if future
dividends do suffer, however, investors may prefer the larger current "divi-
dend" forced by the damage award rather than future economic gains obtained
by selling stock or reinvesting dividends. J. VAN HORNE, FINANcIAL MANAGE-
MENT & PoucY 331 (5th ed. 1980). Target shareholders thus stand to benefit
financially from a damage award levied directly against the target company.
But see Frankel, supra note 46, at 577-78. At least one court has concluded,
without going through this analysis, that a damage award levied directly
against the target corporation benefits target shareholders in a manner unlike
the damage award rejected in the Chris-Craft case. In re Commonwealth
Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 227, 241 (W.D. Tex. 1979).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
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indications of congressional intent, a court should imply a pri-
vate cause of action for target shareholders who sue for dam-
ages based on their decisions whether to sell on the market
before the tender offer takes effect.
IV. TIMING OF PRE-TENDER OFFER LIABILITY
If section 14(e) is interpreted to allow imposition of liabil-
ity on target management for pre-tender offer misrepresenta-
tions, whether these actions are based on a shareholder's pre-
tender offer decision or on a shareholder's actual tender offer
decision, it then becomes necessary to identify the stage at
which courts should impose damage liability for pre-tender
misrepresentations. Three alternative rules are available. At
one extreme, courts might impose potential damage liability on
target management at the earliest possible stage, once an of-
feror has taken "a substantial step or steps to commence" 173 a
tender offer-the "substantial step" test. At the other extreme,
courts might impose potential damage liability on target man-
agement at a very late stage, once an offeror both makes a pub-
lic announcement of a proposed tender offer and indicates a
definite intent to make an actual offer-the "definite intent"
test. This Note does not accept either approach and, instead,
proposes a rule making target management potentially liable in
damages once any person makes a public announcement con-
cerning a tender offer proposal-the "public announcement"
test.
A. THE "SuBSTANIAL STEP" TEST
The "substantial step" test is derived from rule 14e-3,174 a
SEC rule mandating any person obtaining material inside in-
formation concerning a tender offer to disclose such informa-
tion to the public a reasonable time before personally engaging
in market trading.175 Under the rule, if any person has taken a
substantial step or steps to commence a tender offer, those who
173. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1981).
174. Id. The SEC enacted the rule after the Supreme Court's decision in
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). In Chiarella, an employee of a
printing company hired by a tender offeror obtained inside information con-
'cerning the future tender offer and used this information for investment pur-
poses, without disclosing his knowledge publicly. The Supreme Court held that
the employee, absent a duty to speak, did not have to disclose his inside knowl-
edge. Id. at 235. The Court found that the trial court had not instructed the
jury on the duty, if any, that the employee owed to the offering company and
its shareholders. Id. at 236.
175. If rule 14e-3 had existed at the time Chiarella obtained his inside
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know of the proposed transaction are under a duty either to
disclose their knowledge prior to trading or to abstain from
trading.176 In the present context, the "substantial step" test
would impose potential damage liability for target manage-
ment's misrepresentations made after the offeror has taken
substantial steps to commence a tender offer.
Although the "substantial step" test imposes potential
damage liability on target management at a very early stage in
the tender offer process, and thus encourages responsible ac-
tions at this same early stage, this test has two disadvantages.
First, the test would lead to extensive litigation over the mean-
ing of a "substantial step." Although the SEC has published a
list of activities that constitute a substantial step under rule
14e-3, it has explicitly noted that this list is not all-inclusive, 77
thus allowing management to debate the scope of the phrase.
Second, the "substantial step" test would often be inconsistent
with the scope of section 14(e). Many substantial steps in com-
mencing a potential tender offer take place before either the
target management or the offeror makes a public announce-
ment.178 If shareholders sue under section 14(e) for misrepre-
sentations that occurred after the substantial steps were taken,
but before a public announcement was made, they will likely
not prevail; such misrepresentations arguably are too far re-
moved from a tender offer context and are, therefore, not "in
connection with" a tender offer, as required under the Williams
Act.17 9 Consequently, the "substantial step" test is an inade-
knowledge, the rule would have made him liable for not having disclosed this
information before trading publicly.
176. The SEC published this list in connection with its promulgation of rule
14e-3:
The Commission believes that a substantial step or steps to commence
a tender offer include, but are not limited to, voting on a resolution by
the offering person's board of directors relating to the tender offer; the
formulation of a plan or proposal to make a tender offer by the offering
person or the person(s) acting on behalf of the offering person; or ac-
tivities which substantially facilitate the tender offer such as: arrang-
ing financing for a tender offer; preparing or directing or authorizing
the preparation of tender offer materials; or authorizing negotiations,
negotiating or entering into an agreement with any person to act as a
dealer manager, soliciting dealer, forwarding agent or depository in
connection with the tender offer.
Sec. Act Release No. 6239, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,413 n.33 (1980).
177. Id.
178. Many of the actions that constitute a substantial step under the SEC's
list will necessarily occur before the announcement of a proposed tender offer.
The offeror, for example, will certainly formulate the proposal and vote on it
before making the proposed offer public.
179. If the tender offer has not even been publically proposed, the misrepre-
sentations occur in circumstances under which investors buy and sell the tar-
[Vol. 66:865
WILLIAMS ACT
quate test for imposing liability on target management.
B. THE "DEFINITE INTENT" TEST
The "definite intent" test'8 0 would extend potential damage
liability to target management for misrepresentations made af-
ter an offeror has made a public announcement of a tender of-
fer proposal and has indicated a clear and definite intent to
carry out that offer. This rule has three disadvantages. The
phrase "clear and definite intent," like the phrase "substantial
step," is ambiguous and would be litigated frequently. A court
might conclude that a clear and definite intent exists if the of-
feror has precisely defined the terms of the pending tender of-
fer.181 Alternatively, a court might conclude that a clear and
definite intent exists only if the offeror has bound itself to actu-
ally make a tender offer.182
In addition to being ambiguous, the "definite intent" test
would not prevent the target from making a misleading public
announcement if the statement is made prior to the offeror's
public announcement of the proposal. Since the potential of-
feror, under any interpretation of the test, would not yet have
get's stock with no knowedge of a forthcoming tender offer. Thus, the target's
misconduct could be dealt with more appropriately under rule 10b-5, which pro-
hibits fraudulent conduct "in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
180. This two-part test is derived from Judge Weinfeld's opinion in Applied
Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
181. See, e.g., Reserve Mgmt. v. Anchor Daily Income Fund, 459 F. Supp. 597,
608 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In this case, the district court refused to apply section
14(e) in the absence of a public announcement of a proposed tender offer or
conduct indicating a clear and definite intent to make such an offer.
182. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1190 (N.D. lL
1980), aff'd, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981). If this test
were so interpreted, very few proposed tender offerors would display the re-
quired "clear and definite intent." Typically, a tender offer always contains a
series of conditions.
To minimize risk during a tender offer, the buyer can attach nearly as
many conditions to consummation as he wants. A normal offer con-
tains about six to eight standard conditions, which negate the transac-
tion if untoward events occur, such as government intervention,
suspension of trading of securities on the stock exchange, issuance by
the target company of additional stock, any adverse change in its busi-
ness or financial condition, or commencement of war involving the
United States.
In addition to these, the buyer may tailor other conditions to suit
his convenience in the deal.
Troubh, Purchased Affection: A Primer on Cash Tender Offers, HAxv. Bus. REV.
July-Aug. 1976, at 79, 81 (1976). The Senate, in its final report on the Williams
Act, also noted the conditional nature of the tender offer. "The person making
the offer obligates himself to purchase all or a specified portion of the tendered
shares if certain specified conditions are met." S. REP., supra note 1, at 2.
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shown a clear and definite intent to make a tender offer, the
rule would not apply.183 Finally, the "definite intent" test may
not cover a situation in which a target company publicly an-
nounces a proposal to buy its own stock, when in fact that tar-
get never intends to make an offer but only intends to
discourage a hostile bidder. By carefully wording an announce-
ment of a proposed tender offer, target management might suc-
cessfully, and deceptively, deter other potential bidders and yet
avoid indicating a clear and definite intent to carry out the pro-
posal. 8 4 The "definite intent" test therefore does not ade-
quately place potential damage liability on target management
for pre-tender offer misrepresentations.
C. THE "PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT" TEST
This Note proposes a rule that imposes potential damage li-
ability on target management when a public announcement
concerning a tender offer is first made. This test avoids the dis-
advantages inherent in the two preceding alternative rules.
There will be little litigation concerning the meaning of a
" public announcement." This term has a generally accepted
183. This factual setting arose in Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, [1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 96,268, at 92,823 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
5, 1978). In Humanz, Humana wrote privately to Medicorp indicating
Humana's desire to make a tender offer for Medicorp stock. Medicorp re-
sponded by sending letters to its own shareholders, denouncing Humana's pre-
viously private proposal as illegal under the antitrust laws. Medicorp, however,
did not state its reasons for opposing the proposal. Id. at 92,825. The district
court granted Humana injunctive relief under section 14(e) to prevent
Medicorp from making future omissions of material facts in any further corre-
spondence concerning Humana's tender offer proposal. Id. at 92,833. If, be-
cause of Medicorp's misleading communication to its shareholders, Humana
withdrew its tender offer proposal, Medicorp shareholders, predicating a dam-
age action against Medicorp based on the "definite intent" test, would not state
a cause of action; Humana never had the opportunity to demonstrate a "clear
and definite intent" to make an offer prior to Medicorp's misrepresentations.
184. In Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971), a former preferred
shareholder of the defendant corporation brought an action under section
14(e), claiming that the defendant had announced a stock exchange proposal
without intending to make such an exchange, for the purpose of convincing
preferred shareholders to approve previously rejected credit arrangements.
The district court held that since no tender offer took place, section 14(e) did
not apply. SEC Amicus Brief, Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971),
reprinted in 85 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) E-2 (1971). The Second Circuit af-
firmed on other grounds, but noted that "we are not sure we would agree with
the district court's rather restrictive reading of this provision." 439 F.2d at 335.
Under the "definite intent" test, target management could continue to engage
in such practices without fear of damage liability under section 14(e) as long as
it avoided indicating a "clear and definite intent" to make an offer.
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meaning in securities transactions,185 creating a relatively
bright-line test. The test will not, therefore, confront target
management with an ambiguous standard. Moreover, unlike
the "substantial step" test, the "public announcement" test will
not exceed the scope of section 14(e). Misrepresentations
made before the tender offer becomes effective, but after the
proposed tender offer is announced, clearly fall within those
practices that section 14(e) proscribes.186
Unlike the "definite intent" test, the "public announce-
ment" test would prevent the target management from making
misleading public announcements concerning the tender offer
before the offeror has publicly announced its proposal. The
"public announcement" test would hold target management lia-
ble for its misconduct as long as its own announcement con-
cerned a tender offer. Finally, also unlike the "definite intent"
test, the "public announcement test" covers situations in which
target management publicly offers to buy its own stock, but
does not demonstrate a clear and definite intent. Thus, by cir-
cumventing all the disadvantages of the two other alternative
rules, the "public announcement" test becomes the best choice
for defining which pre-tender offer fraudulent practices are for-
bidden by section 14(e).
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the Supreme Court's general reluctance to imply
private causes of action under the federal securities laws, a
court should imply a private cause of action under section
14(e) for those whom Congress clearly intended to protect-
target shareholders. The evidence of congressional intent most
strongly supports a shareholder's action against target manage-
ment for post-tender offer misconduct that affected the share-
holder's tender offer decision. The same evidence also suggests
that courts should imply both legal and equitable relief for pre-
tender offer misconduct if it affected, or will affect, the share-
holder's tender decision. Finally, indications of congressional
intent even support a shareholder's damage action based on
misconduct affecting the shareholder's decision not to sell se-
curities on the open market before the offer became effective.
185. "Public announcement" involves the issuance of a press release. See,
e.g., Indiana Nat'l Bank v. Mobil Oil Corp., 578 F.2d 180, 185 (7th Cir. 1978). The
term also should include deliberate leaks of information concerning a tender
offer proposal. See E. ARANow, R. EmoRN & G. BERLSTEn, supra note 1, at
143-44.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 94-106.
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By implying private relief for target shareholders under the
Williams Act, courts will best carry out the intent of Congress
in enacting section 14(e) to protect the investment decisions of
the target shareholder.
